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O P I N I O N 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
In this § 1983 case, Plaintiff-Appellant Gregory Ricks, 
a former inmate at Pennsylvania State Corrections facility 
SCI-Graterford, appeals the dismissal of his complaint 
3 
 
alleging sexual abuse and excessive force in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.  His two claims arise from an alleged 
incident where, during a routine morning pat-down, 
Corrections Officer Keil rubbed his erect penis against Ricks’ 
buttocks through both men’s clothing.  When Ricks stepped 
away and verbally protested to Keil’s supervisor, Lieutenant 
Shover, Ricks alleges that Shover “slammed” Ricks against 
the wall, causing injuries to his face, head, neck, and back.  
A. 15. 
 
Ricks proceeded pro se, and before the merits of his 
claims could be tested, the District Court granted a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend.  
Ricks did not amend his complaint, and the District Court 
then dismissed his complaint with prejudice.  In so doing, the 
District Court cited our Circuit’s non-precedential opinion, 
Obiegbu v. Werlinger, where we indicated that  “a small 
number of incidents in which a prisoner is verbally harassed, 
touched, and pressed against without his consent do not 
amount” to an Eighth Amendment violation.  581 F. App’x 
119, 121 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
Whether sexual abuse can constitute “cruel and 
unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment is a 
matter of first impression in our Court.  We write today to 
state in plainest terms that it does.  Our society requires 
prisoners to give up their liberty, but that surrender does not 
encompass the basic right to be free from severe unwanted 
sexual contact.   
 
We will give Ricks another chance to cure his 
complaint as it relates to the Eighth Amendment sexual abuse 
claim against Keil, with a view to the applicable law as 
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discussed herein.  Although his sexual abuse claim as to 
Shover under a participation or failure-to-intervene theory 
was properly dismissed, Ricks’ excessive force claim stands 
on a different footing and should have been permitted to 
survive the motion to dismiss.  We will therefore affirm in 
part, vacate in part, and reverse in part the District Court’s 
order, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
In reviewing the District Court’s dismissal order, we 
accept as true the following facts, set forth in Ricks’ 
complaint.  See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 
(2007).  On the morning of September 17, 2014, Ricks, an 
inmate at SCI-Graterford,1 was on his way to the law library 
during morning line movements when Corrections Officer 
Keil2 directed him to undergo a pat-down search in a public 
hallway. Ricks complied and submitted to the search, which 
he alleges was captured by video camera.   
 
While being searched from behind, Ricks felt Keil’s 
erect penis (under clothing) “rubbing up against” Ricks’ 
clothed buttocks.  A. 15.  Ricks stepped away from Keil and 
told him he was “on [his] (ASS).”  Id.  Ricks told Lt. Shover, 
                                              
1 Ricks has since been released on parole. 
2 In his complaint, and as reflected on this case’s caption, 
Ricks refers to “C/O Kile.”  The Commonwealth later 
identified him as Corrections Officer Paul Keil.   
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who was overseeing the line movement, that Keil “is 
[r]ubbing [u]p against my [b]ehind with his genitals.”  Id.   
Shover asked Ricks “what [d]id you say.”  Id.  Ricks 
explained, and Shover “came over to [him] and just slammed 
[him] in the . . . wall.”  Id.  This action gave Ricks a black 
eye, a “[b]usted” nose and lip, and injuries to his head, neck, 
and back.3  Id.  Shover then told Ricks to place his hands 
behind his back so he could be cuffed and returned to his cell.  
Ricks complied.  On the way to Ricks’ cell, Shover directed 
several racial slurs at him.  Ricks also alleges that in the past, 
Shover had continuously harassed him, and that he had 
reported this conduct to other prison officials.   
 
B. Procedural History 
After exhausting administrative remedies, Ricks filed a 
complaint in the United States Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania against Officer Keil and Lt. Shover.  He 
sought monetary and injunctive relief for racial 
discrimination, harassment, sexual abuse, and the use of 
excessive force.4  Proceeding pro se, his standard § 1983 
Prisoner Complaint form briefly set out the above facts.  
Defendants filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  
  
The District Court granted the motion, holding that 
Ricks failed to allege a violation of his Eighth Amendment 
rights.  The District Court dismissed Ricks’ sexual abuse 
                                              
3 On his standard Prisoner Complaint form, Ricks did not 
allege having received any medical treatment for these 
injuries. 
4 Ricks has not pursued his claims for racial discrimination or 
harassment in this appeal. 
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cause of action, citing our non-precedential opinion in 
Obiegbu v. Werlinger, 581 F. App’x 119, 121 (3d Cir. 2014), 
in which we stated that “a small number of incidents in which 
a prisoner is verbally harassed, touched, and pressed against 
without his consent do not amount” to an Eighth Amendment 
violation.  The Court then referred to the five-factor test for 
excessive force set out in Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641 
(3d Cir. 2002), and dismissed Ricks’ excessive force claim as 
well.  
 
The Court dismissed Ricks’ case without prejudice, 
granting him leave to amend his complaint.  The Court 
instructed Ricks to describe “(a) the specific statutory basis 
for federal jurisdiction over this case; (b) the specific events 
which serve as the basis for his claim; (c) how the defendant 
is involved in his claims; and (d) the harm he suffered, if any, 
from each violation.” A. 2.  Ricks did not file an amended 
complaint within the allotted time frame, and so the District 
Court converted its dismissal to one with prejudice.  This 
appeal followed.5 
 
II. DISCUSSION  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1343.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, as the District Court’s dismissal with 
                                              
5 Coupled with his motion for appointed counsel, which we 
granted, Ricks filed a motion for extension of time to amend 
his complaint.  Ricks’ attorney is appearing pro bono.  We 
express our gratitude to him for accepting this matter and for 
the high caliber of representation of his client before our 
Court.  
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prejudice was a final order.  We exercise plenary review over 
the dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  United States ex rel. Customs Fraud 
Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 242, 248 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  We accept all factual allegations in the complaint 
as true, and affirm the dismissal only if the well-pleaded 
facts, accepted as true, do not plausibly provide a basis for 
relief.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  When a plaintiff files pro 
se, we have “a special obligation to construe his complaint 
liberally.”  Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d Cir. 1992).   
 
The Eighth Amendment guarantees the right to be free 
from “cruel and unusual punishments” while in custody.  
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (quoting U.S. 
Const. amend. VIII).  A properly stated Eighth Amendment 
claim must allege a subjective and objective element.  
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).  First, it must 
appear from the complaint that the defendant official acted 
with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”  Wilson v. Seiter, 
501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991).  Second, the conduct must have 
been objectively “harmful enough,” or “sufficiently serious” 
to violate the Constitution.  Id. at 298, 303.   
 
Ricks has asserted two types of Eighth Amendment 
claims:  one for sexual abuse (against both Defendants), and 
one for excessive force (against Lt. Shover only).  We 
examine each in turn. 
 
A. Sexual Abuse Claim 
Whether sexual abuse of inmates by prison officials 
offends the Eighth Amendment is a matter of first impression 
in our Court.  Today, we join numerous sister Circuits in 
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holding that prison sexual abuse can violate the Constitution.  
See Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 
1999); Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997).  
We agree that “sexual abuse of prisoners, once overlooked as 
a distasteful blight on the prison system, offends our most 
basic principles of just punishment.”  Crawford v. Cuomo, 
796 F.3d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 2015).  Sexual abuse invades the 
most basic of dignity interests:  to be treated as a human 
being.  We condemn such abuse as it is “simply not part of 
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses 
against society.”  Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861 (quoting Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).   
 
1. Legal Framework 
Though the Supreme Court has not addressed sexual 
abuse of inmates by prison officials, courts grappling with 
this issue have drawn from the Supreme Court’s excessive 
force precedents and its holding in Farmer v. Brennan that 
sexual assaults of inmates by inmates can implicate the right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  See, e.g., 
Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861.  Thus, the framework for excessive 
force claims set forth in Hudson v. McMillian—composed of 
a subjective and objective prong—has evolved to encompass 
claims for sexual abuse and harassment by prison officials as 
well.  See, e.g., id. (describing the Hudson test’s objective and 
subjective components as applying to sexual abuse claims); 
Boxer X, 437 F.3d at 1111 (same); Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 
1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997) (same).  
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In particular, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s reasoning in its two landmark Eighth 
Amendment sexual abuse cases informs our analysis.  In 
1997, the Second Circuit concluded in Boddie v. Schnieder 
that in some circumstances, sexual abuse could present a 
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.  105 F.3d at 861.  
There, the plaintiff had alleged that a female corrections 
officer squeezed his penis and said “[Y]ou know [you’re] a 
sexy black devil, I like you.”  Id. at 860 (first alteration in 
original).  He further averred that she bumped into him “with 
both her breast so hard [he] could feel the points of her 
nipples against [his] chest,” and that she “bumped into him . . 
. with her whole body vagina against penis pinning [him] to 
the door.”  Id. 
 
As to the objective prong, the Court stated that “there 
can be no doubt that severe or repetitive sexual abuse of an 
inmate by a prison officer can be ‘objectively, sufficiently 
serious’ enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment 
violation.”  Id. at 861 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).  
Concerning Hudson’s subjective prong, the Court declared 
that “[w]here no legitimate law enforcement or penological 
purpose can be inferred from the defendant’s alleged conduct, 
the abuse itself may, in some circumstances, be sufficient 
evidence of a culpable state of mind.”  Id.  The Court thus 
concluded that sexual abuse could meet both prongs of 
Hudson’s test for Eighth Amendment violations—although 
on the facts before it, the Court declined to find a sufficiently 
objective harm in order to state a constitutional claim.  Id. 
 
Nearly twenty years later, the Second Circuit clarified 
that “Boddie recognized that a single act of sexual abuse may 
violate the Eighth Amendment if, as in this case, it is entirely 
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gratuitous and devoid of penological purpose.”  Crawford, 
796 F.3d. at 257 (emphasis added).  In Crawford, one of the 
two plaintiffs alleged that during a frisk in the middle of a 
visit with the inmate’s wife, the defendant corrections officer 
fondled and squeezed his penis to “make sure [he] did not 
have an erection.”  Id. at 255.  The other plaintiff alleged that 
during a search, the officer grabbed and held his penis and 
asked “what’s that?”  Id.  The officer then pinned the plaintiff 
to the wall while continuing to “squeeze” and “fondle” the 
area around his penis and “roam” his hands down the 
inmate’s thigh.  Id.  The officer also threatened the inmate 
with solitary confinement if he resisted the abuse.  Id.  The 
Court explained that “[to] show that an incident or series of 
incidents was serious enough to implicate the Constitution, an 
inmate need not allege that there was penetration, physical 
injury, or direct contact with uncovered genitalia.”  Id. at 257.  
Rather, the Court held that “[a] corrections officer’s 
intentional contact with an inmate’s genitalia or other 
intimate area, which serves no penological purpose and is 
undertaken with the intent to gratify the officer’s sexual 
desire or to humiliate the inmate, violates the Eighth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 254.   
 
Following Boddie and Crawford, we resolve that a 
properly stated Eighth Amendment sexual abuse claim need 
not necessarily depend on the number of incidents.  We agree 
with the statement made by the Court in Crawford that “a 
single incident of sexual abuse, if sufficiently severe or 
serious, may violate an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights no 
less than repetitive abusive conduct.”  Id. at 257 (emphasis 
added). 
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Here, without analyzing Ricks’ sexual abuse claim, the 
District Court cited to our non-precedential opinion in 
Obiegbu v. Werlinger, 581 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2014), for 
the proposition that a single incident cannot constitute a 
constitutional violation.  While we cannot be sure if the 
District Court intended to impose a formal numerosity 
requirement on Ricks’ claims, we conclude that an emphasis 
on the number of incidents as a gatekeeper for objective 
seriousness is misplaced.  We decline to adopt a per se rule 
regarding the number of incidents as bearing on severity.  
Instead, we conclude that the test will turn on an analysis of a 
subjective and an objective component.  That is, the incident 
must be objectively, sufficiently intolerable and cruel, capable 
of causing harm, and the official must have a culpable state of 
mind.  We next turn to what each prong requires. 
 
Regarding the subjective prong, we consider whether 
the official had a legitimate penological purpose or if he or 
she acted “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of 
causing harm.”  Albers, 475 U.S. at 319–320 (quoting 
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).  
Because this is a mental state, “unless admitted, [it] has to be 
inferred rather than observed” from conduct such as harassing 
comments, or an overly invasive search in violation of facility 
policy.  Washington, 695 F.3d at 643; see Crawford, 796 F.3d 
at 258 (“There is no penological justification for checking to 
see if an inmate has an erection . . . .”).  The nature of the 
violative conduct itself will often be enough to demonstrate 
the prison official’s culpable state of mind.  See Crawford, 
796 F.3d at 252 (“[I]f . . . the officer intentionally brings his 
or her genitalia into contact with the inmate in order to arouse 
or gratify the officer’s sexual desire or humiliate the inmate, a 
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violation is self-evident because there can be no penological 
justification for such contact.”).   
 
While the subjective inquiry involves a judgment call 
that may be relatively easy to make based on the specific 
circumstances, the objective prong seems more difficult.  
What level of inappropriate conduct objectively constitutes a 
violation?  At the outset, we readily acknowledge that this 
kind of line-drawing is difficult in part because it is 
uncomfortable.  It requires parsing a set of allegations or facts 
that may be deeply troubling, and making a judgment as to 
whether the conduct alleged implicates the Constitution.  
Nevertheless, it is within our purview to provide guidance as 
to which claims may “involve a harm of federal constitutional 
proportions.”  Boddie, 105 F.3d at 861.   
 
When deciding objective harm, “not . . . every 
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 
cause of action.”  Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.  Indeed, “[t]he 
Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons.’”  
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 
U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).  Rather, in contrast to common tort 
law, the Eighth Amendment shields inmates from only those 
actions “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Hudson, 
503 U.S. at 10 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327).  The 
objective element “is therefore contextual and responsive to 
‘contemporary standards of decency.’”  Id. at 8 (quoting 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).  And 
“conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under 
contemporary standards are not unconstitutional.”  Rhodes, 
452 U.S. at 347.   
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Ricks has urged us to adopt a standard that would 
collapse the subjective and objective inquiries, so that a 
finding of a lack of penological purpose would be 
determinative.  He draws this standard from Crawford, in 
which the Court declared that: “In determining whether an 
Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, the principal 
inquiry is whether the contact is incidental to legitimate 
official duties, such as a justifiable pat frisk or strip search, or 
by contrast whether it is undertaken to arouse or gratify the 
officer or humiliate the inmate.”  796 F.3d at 257–58.   
 
We do not take issue with the focus of the analysis by 
other courts on whether the official performing the search had 
a penological purpose.  See, e.g., id. at 258 (concluding that 
“no amount of gratuitous or sexually-motivated fondling of 
an inmate’s genitals” is constitutional).  That is, when a 
search involves intrusive, intimate touching to ensure that 
contraband and weapons are not present, an inquiry into its 
purpose is legitimate.  For instance, in Crawford, the 
corrections officer allegedly “fondled and squeezed [the 
plaintiff’s] penis” during a visit with the plaintiff’s wife, to 
“make sure [he] did not have an erection.”  Id. at 258.  We 
have no doubt that this level of touching would be 
objectively, sufficiently serious to violate the Constitution.  
But because it occurred during a search, the Court needed to 
determine whether that search was legitimate or pretextual.  
Moreover, the Court clarified that “even if contact between an 
officer and inmate’s genitalia was initially justified, if the 
officer finds no contraband, continued sexual contact may be 
actionable.”  Id. at 257.   
 
Absent a legitimate penological purpose, the type of 
touching involved in, for instance, a body-cavity search, 
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would be undoubtedly cruel and unusual.  And a desire to 
humiliate the inmate or gratify the officer—inferred through 
the officer’s conduct—is a reasonable way to distinguish 
between invasive touching that is permitted by law to ensure 
safety and that which is not.  An analysis focused on intent of 
the officer is therefore appropriate when evaluating whether 
an objectively intrusive search is constitutional.   
 
We have previously discussed this distinction as it 
pertains to claims for unconstitutional prison conditions.  In 
Parkell v. Danberg, where an inmate was “subjected to 
thrice-daily visual body-cavity searches,” we concluded that 
those searches would only be cruel and unusual if they were 
“undertaken maliciously or for the purposes of sexually 
abusing” the plaintiff.  833 F.3d 313, 335–36 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Crawford, 796 F.3d at 258).  We found a focus on 
intent necessary to demarcate permissible from ultra vires 
invasiveness.  Accordingly, the inquiry to define culpable 
state of mind versus legitimate penological purpose is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, inquiry. 
 
Fusing the subjective and objective inquiries, as Ricks 
urges we must, would constitutionalize any alleged touch, if 
the corrections officer lacked a penological purpose.  We 
decline to entirely eliminate the objective prong of the 
analysis by collapsing it with the subjective prong.  That is to 
say, even if sexualized touching lacks a penological purpose, 
it may still fall below the threshold of constitutional 
cognizability based on a lack of objective seriousness. 
 
As noted above, a single incident, if sufficiently 
serious or severe, can run afoul of the Eighth Amendment as 
surely as can multiple, less egregious incidents.  While a 
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pattern of harassment and sexualized touching may more 
clearly be considered objectively “cruel and unusual,” that 
does not diminish the harm that may arise from an isolated 
act.  See Crawford, 796 F.3d at 257 (stating that 
“[r]ecurrences of abuse” are relevant, but not dispositive, to 
severity).   
 
Moreover, while our framework explicitly draws from 
the Supreme Court’s excessive force jurisprudence, the 
absence of force or injury will not doom a sexual abuse claim 
outright.  Although physical injury will certainly signal 
severity, it is not the touchstone for objective seriousness.6  
Whether an action is sufficiently harmful to be cruel and 
unusual cannot be determined only by looking at physical 
injury, because an abusive sexual encounter may not leave 
any marks.  Indeed, sexual abuse “tend[s] rather to cause 
significant distress and often lasting psychological harm.”  
Washington, 695 F.3d at 643. 
   
Whether conduct is objectively cruel and unusual is 
better considered with sensitivity to “evolving standards of 
decency.”  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010) 
(quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102).  Ricks posits that the 
                                              
6 Indeed, Congress recently amended the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (“PLRA”) to add to its physical injury 
requirement an avenue for recovery for emotional damages 
for sexual abuse, perhaps acknowledging that sexual abuse 
may not result in physical injury.  See Violence Against 
Women Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 113-12, § 1101, 
127 Stat. 54, 134 (Jan. 3, 2013), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e (amending the section imposing the physical injury 
requirement to insert “or the commission of a sexual act”). 
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current standard vis-à-vis sexualized touching in prison 
contexts is “zero tolerance.”  Opening Br. at 15.  We are 
aware that societal norms surrounding unwanted sexual 
attention are changing rapidly, and we are mindful that 
behavior that may not have warranted damages in the past 
may so warrant today.  We nonetheless are not persuaded that 
the current standard is zero tolerance for all minor sexualized 
touching in prison, such that all such claims are objectively 
serious to a constitutional degree. 
 
When considering contemporary standards of decency, 
we begin by reviewing “objective indicia of consensus, as 
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that 
have addressed the question.”  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 564 (2005).  We also examine the “consistency of the 
direction of change.”  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 
(2002). 
 
In recent years, both the federal government and all 
but two of the states have passed legislation outlawing sexual 
activity between guards and inmates.  See Crawford, 796 F.3d 
at 259–60 nn. 5–6 (collecting state statutes).  As we elaborate 
below, these enactments reflect a societal standard that 
conduct falling outside the definition for “rape” nonetheless is 
taken seriously and compensable by damages at law.  They do 
not, however, compel a finding that all inappropriate touching 
is per se unconstitutional. 
 
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”), passed 
unanimously by Congress, explicitly seeks to “establish a 
zero tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in the 
prisons of the United States.”  34 U.S.C. § 30302(1).  Rape is 
objectively intolerable, cruel, and unusual.  But the statute 
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defines “rape” so as to overtly encompass severe misconduct.  
See id. § 30309(9) (defining “rape” as “the carnal knowledge, 
oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling 
of a person, forcibly or against that person’s will”).   
 
Similarly, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 
intended to address an overwhelming number of prisoner-
initiated lawsuits in federal courts, limits recovery for mental 
and emotional injuries unless a litigant can show “physical 
injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 
1997(e).  And “sexual act” as defined explicitly excludes 
touching that is unintentional or “through the clothing.”  See 
18 U.S.C. § 2246(2).  We therefore do not read the PREA and 
the PLRA as evincing Congressional intent to create a zero-
tolerance standard for minor sexual touching.   
 
Nor do similar state enactments criminalizing sexual 
contact between inmates and prison officials envisage a zero 
tolerance standard.  For instance, Pennsylvania, where SCI 
Graterford is located, criminalizes guard-inmate rape, sexual 
assault, and “indecent contact.”  Indecent contact, the least 
serious of the defined offenses, is “[a]ny touching of the 
sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of 
arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.”  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. §§ 3101; 3124.2.  Thus, while the “consistency of 
the direction of change” towards outlawing such contact 
assures us that our society no longer accepts sexual abuse, 
that change does not oblige us to constitutionalize “every 
malevolent touch.” 
 
As this inquiry is necessarily contextual, fact-specific, 
and to be conducted in the first instance by the District Court, 
we decline to craft a mechanical factors test for when sexual 
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contact is objectively, sufficiently serious.  The scope, place, 
and timing of the offensive conduct will bear on its severity, 
as will the details of the alleged contact.  But it goes without 
saying that objectively serious sexual contact would include 
sexualized fondling, coerced sexual activity, combinations of 
ongoing harassment and abuse, and exchanges of sexual 
activity for special treatment or to avoid discipline.  In 
context, including whether it violates established prison 
procedures, other sexualized touching may also be objectively 
serious.   
 
2. Application 
We now consider Ricks’ claims against Officer Keil 
and Lt. Shover. 
 
 a. Sexual Abuse Claim Against Officer Keil 
We are wary of setting a constitutional floor based on 
the fact patterns in our sister Circuits’ Eighth Amendment 
sexual abuse cases.  Many of those cases were primarily 
based on more manifestly violent misconduct.  See, e.g., 
Crawford, 796 F.3d at 255 (allegations that prison official 
fondled and squeezed inmate’s penis while making 
threatening remarks); Giron, 191 F.3d at 1284 (allegations of 
rape).  Even in Boxer X, where the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided under its own 
excessive force precedent that the inmate’s allegations were 
de minimis, he had alleged that a prison guard had solicited 
his masturbation under threat of reprisal.  Boxer X, 437 F.3d 
at 1109.   
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Nevertheless, a situation falling below the level of 
objective seriousness present in those cases is not per se 
excluded from constitutional cognizance.  This is a fact-
specific inquiry.  Because we cannot definitively say that, 
consistent with his complaint, Ricks could not plead other 
facts relevant to objective seriousness under the standard we 
have articulated, he should be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to cure his complaint by amendment.  
 
To be sure, Officer Keil’s alleged behavior was, by 
any standard, inappropriate and unprofessional.  It is not clear 
from the face of Ricks’ complaint whether the touching was 
incidental to a legitimate pat-down search.  Yet, the episode 
as alleged appeared to be isolated, momentary, and avoided 
by Ricks’ ability to step away from the offending touch.  
Absent more specific allegations as to the severity of Keil’s 
conduct or the surrounding context, including the need for the 
search, we cannot conclude that he plausibly violated Ricks’ 
right to be free from “cruel and unusual punishments.”  By 
this, we do not intend to trivialize Ricks’ allegations, nor 
suggest that he did not suffer harm. Rather, the Constitution 
may require more detail in his pleadings before a federal 
court recognizes his claim.  
 
We have maintained that imprisoned pro se litigants 
“often lack the resources and freedom necessary to comply 
with the technical rules of modern litigation.”  Mala v. Crown 
Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013).  Now 
that Ricks is represented ably by pro bono counsel, he should 
be given another chance to amend his complaint to allege 
facts specifying the incident’s seriousness or severity, as well 
as its purpose, and any other facts that would provide context.  
Whether his complaint as amended will be sufficient is a 
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matter yet to be determined.  In particular, the controlling 
legal principles we announce today must be applied to the 
facts alleged.  But Ricks should have the opportunity to 
present allegations with due consideration to the law which 
controls his case.  We will therefore vacate the District 
Court’s dismissal of his sexual abuse claim against Keil and 
remand so that he can re-plead his claim. 
 
b. Sexual Abuse Claim Against Lieutenant 
Shover 
 
Ricks raises an independent sexual abuse claim against 
Lt. Shover, whom he claims participated in the alleged abuse 
by failing to end it.  As pleaded, this claim is insubstantial 
because the encounter was so brief that, even viewed in the 
light most favorable to Ricks, Shover simply would have had 
no opportunity to instruct Keil to stop.   
 
The incident’s brevity similarly defeats Ricks’ failure-
to-intervene claim against Shover.  An officer’s failure to stop 
an ongoing constitutional violation violates the Eighth 
Amendment when he “had a reasonable opportunity to 
intervene and simply refused to do so.”  Smith, 293 F.3d at 
650–51.  According to Ricks, Shover had the opportunity 
when Ricks verbally protested to him, and refused to 
intervene and punished Ricks for seeking assistance.  But 
again, the alleged violation was over before Ricks called out 
to Shover.  And Smith cautions that liability will only attach if 
the opportunity to intervene is “realistic and reasonable.” Id. 
at 651.  While Shover’s alleged reaction is disturbing, it is 
better addressed through an excessive force claim, as we 
discuss below, than through a failure-to-intervene claim.  We 
therefore will affirm in part, because the District Court 
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properly dismissed this claim, and amendment with respect to 
this claim would be futile. 
 
 
 
B. Excessive Force Claim 
Ricks frames his excessive force claim only against Lt. 
Shover.  The thrust of his complaint is straightforward:  he 
alleges that Shover unlawfully used excessive force when he 
slammed Ricks into a wall with enough force to cause injury.  
He further avers that he sustained injuries to his head, neck, 
and back, a black eye, and a “busted” nose and lip.  A. 15.  
He does not plead any facts respecting medical treatment of 
these alleged injuries.   
 
We have clarified that “the pivotal inquiry in 
reviewing an inmate’s § 1983 claim for excessive force is 
‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain 
or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm.’” Smith, 293 F.3d at 649 (quoting Brooks v. Kyler, 204 
F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000)).  In conducting this analysis of 
the officer’s intent, we consider five factors:  “(1) the need for 
the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need 
and the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the 
injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of 
staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible 
officials on the basis of facts known to them; and (5) any 
efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.”  
Id. (quoting Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106).  The objective 
component of the excessive force inquiry is met when “the 
inmate’s injury was more than de minimis.”  Fuentes v. 
Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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Here, the District Court correctly cited Smith, but did 
not evaluate the facts under those factors.  Ricks avers that a 
proper analysis under the factors would lead to the conclusion 
that he plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment violation.  
Affording him, as a plaintiff proceeding pro se, the benefit of 
any doubt, we agree that his complaint should not have been 
dismissed.   
 
While Ricks’ pleading may not have been detailed 
enough for the Court to analyze all of the factors, certainly 
the allegations of his being “slammed” and the injuries caused 
suggest a use of force that was out of proportion to the 
relative calm of the situation.  With further pleading or 
discovery, the need for the use of force (like the penological 
purpose or state of mind), threat to safety, and extent of 
injuries can be further developed.  But, viewing the sparse 
record and our responsibility to construe Ricks’ complaint 
liberally, we cannot conclude that he has failed to state a 
plausible claim for relief.7   
 
While we express no view as to the merits of Ricks’ 
claim against Shover, we conclude that the District Court 
erred by dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order with 
respect to his excessive force claim, and remand for further 
proceedings.  
 
 
                                              
7 We also note that at oral argument, Defendants’ counsel all 
but conceded the point.  See Oral Argument at 31:53, Ricks v. 
Shover (No. 16-2939) (3d Cir. Feb. 9, 2018). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 The District Court based its dismissal of Ricks’ sexual 
abuse claim against Officer Keil on an incomplete 
understanding of the law that we clarify today.  And although 
it properly dismissed Ricks’ independent sexual abuse claim 
against Shover, the Court prematurely dismissed his 
excessive force claim against him.  Therefore, we will vacate 
the Court’s order insofar as it dismissed the sexual abuse 
claim against Officer Keil, affirm the portion of the order 
dismissing the sexual abuse claim against Shover, reverse the 
portion of the order dismissing the excessive force claim 
against Shover, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this Opinion.   
